#### Go flips aff.

**Go 21** (Julian Go is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Boston University. He is a coeditor of The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives, also published by Duke University Press) "Three tensions in the theory of racial capitalism." Sociological Theory 39.1 (2021): 38-47, DM

For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference, and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capital- ism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideo- logical necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to hap- pen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9

#### 3. Political Blackface DA: Their alternative is a form of parasitism and political Blackface that ensures the alt is anti-Black, reject the team for co-opting Black literature.

**Grimes 2018**(Kate, is Assistant Professor of Theology at Villanova University. “LET BLACK PEOPLE BE: A Plea for Racial Specificity in the Afterlife of Africanized Slavery” JRE 46.3:497–520. © 2018 Journal of Religious Ethics)

**Despite errors in execution, the underlying drive to position non-black people of color**and white Hispanics **as like African Americans may appear noble and ordered towards the end of inter-racial solidarity. But intruth it replicates the parasitic relation that has animated both slavery and its ongoing afterlife.** As Orlando Patterson summarizes, **slavery comprises the ultimate form of human parasitism** (Patterson 1982, 14, 206 and Hartman 2007, 6).**And in the afterlife of slavery, antiblackness supremacy aims to preserve this parasitic relation. Africanized slavery and its ongoing afterlife shape more than just the material and economic realm; they continue to structure this country’s collective imagination**(Hartman 2007, 6). In this way, **political and ethical discourse and power rely heavily upon and often operate as a form of parasitic consumption of the histories, experiences, and resistance movements of black people**. How so? **Just as white slave owning British colonists declared themselves “slaves of king George,” so “the women’s movement,**the Chicano liberation movement, **queer movements, and many more have adopted the strategies, tactics, and theory of the Black liberation movement”** (Wilderson 2010, 21; Black Lives Matter Movement 2016). **More conservative political movements do so as well.** Expressing a widely held tenet of libertarian ideology, Kentucky Senator Rand Paul decries government taxation as a form of enslavement, arguing that “if [the government] taxes you at 100% then you’ve got zero percent liberty,” but, “if [it] taxes you at 50% you are half slave, half free” (Kaczynski 2015). **In a similar way, the firmly held belief that “the moral dimension of the case for life are similar to the moral dimension of the case against slavery” represents “an entirely mainstream, pro-life view”** (French 2015).6 **Almost without exception, all political movements depict themselves as the new abolitionists and the victims whose cause they champion as the new black slaves. In a sense, all Americans wear political blackface. This occurs un-coincidentally. The analogy of slavery does to blackness in the symbolic realm what the practice of slavery did to enslaved people over the course of their lives: it reduces it to an infinitely fungible instrument. When deployed analogically, blackness takes whatever shape nonblack people assign it. Just as enslaved people served as chefs, agricultural experts, concubines, gestational surrogates, musicians, farmworkers, blacksmiths, drivers, wet nurses, among other positions, so black history and suffering serve the ends of non-black political movements. Antiblackness supremacy aims to deny to both blackness and to black people lives of their own; it prefers that they live primarily in, through, and for the sake of those who enlist them in their service.**7 **While enslavement strived simultaneously to strip enslaved people of their individuality and exploit it, the analogy of blackness exploits and obfuscates the uniqueness of antiblackness supremacy. Just as slavery comprises the ultimate form of human parasitism, slavery and antiblackness have served as the ultimate political and moral analogy. Why does this analogy enact a parasitical antiblackness? First, this rhetorical trope falsely positions antiblackness supremacy as a relic of the past, an evil we have overcome. In this way, the LGBT rights movement compares itself to not the fight against the war on drugs, but the civil rights movement.8 Anti-abortion activists, for example, similarly compare the fetus not to black victims of extrajudicial murder like Mike Brown, but to the black slave. Second, in positing an analogy between the way the United States treated black people in the past and the way it currently treats, for example, LGBT people, fetuses, or the coercively taxed, those who deploy this trope accuse their opponents of caring more about black people than they do other groups. Even though non-black people both benefit from and perpetuate antiblackness supremacy, the analogy of slavery misrepresents black people as possessing rights and freedom that other groups are denied. As a result, black people appear uniquely favored and protected. Third, this rhetorical move takes black people’s suffering and struggles and expropriates it on behalf of another group. In so doing, the analogy of slavery and/or antiblackness supremacy ultimately renders contemporary black demands for freedom and justice less coherent.**Indeed, if everyone is a slave, then no one is a slave. **The universalization of the struggle against slavery makes everyone simultaneously deserving of and deprived of freedom except for actual slaves. Since black people already have freedom, they are not entitled to more of it. This background helps to explain why racial concepts and terminologies that fail to distinguish antiblack racism from other forms of injustice risk recapitulating the symbolic underpinnings of slavery’s afterlife. The injustices inflicted upon non-black people of color differ from those endured by black people much more than they resemble them**. This holds even more true with respect to people of Latin American descent who are classified as white. Since antiblackness supremacy shapes our collective moral, political, and theological imaginations, we non-black theologians invariably struggle to denounce racism without relying upon antiblack tropes and analogies. In this way, for example, Cassidy and Mikulich proclaim, “the fact that whites do not think of themselves as living in a white ghetto is an integral problem of hyper-incarceration today” (Cassidy and Mikulich 2007, 82). In truth, they continue, “whites tend to not be aware of the fact that as of the 2010 census of 16 major metropolises, whites are more self-segregated than any other racial or ethnic group” (Cassidy and Mikulich 2007, 19). Even while explicitly condemning the white supremacist prison and ghetto, these scholars portray the ghetto as a choice ignorant people make rather than a uniquely stigmatizing form of spatial violence society imposes upon a select group of people. Ironically, Cassidy and Mikulich make an anti-black argument against anti-blackness: according to the implicit logic of this rhetorical appeal, white people who enact antiblack forms of racial segregation are the real blacks.9

#### Unions are locked in fossil and gas.

**Nieves 23** (Alex Nieves is the California transportation reporter at POLITICO and is part of the team behind California Climate, a daily newsletter about how the politics of climate change are shaping the future of the state) “Labor unions are still giving Democrats climate headaches”, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/04/california-unions-oil-green-jobs-00129724, DM

Despite the Biden administration and California lawmakers pouring billions of dollars into new climate-friendly industries like electric vehicles, hydrogen and building electrification, a key player in state politics is still defending fossil fuel interests that provide thousands of well-paying jobs.

President Joe Biden’s investment in clean energy sectors through a pair of massive spending bills — which promise lucrative tax credits for projects that pay union wages — **was supposed to speed up the labor transition away from oil and gas.** That **hasn’t happened in deep-blue California, home to the country’s most ambitious climate policies — and most influential labor unions**.

“**We believe we’re still going to be working in the oil and gas space for the foreseeable future,”** said Chris Hannan, **president of the State Building and Construction Trades Council** of California, which represents nearly 500,000 members across dozens of local unions, from pipefitting to electrical work.

**Unions’ longstanding — and well-founded — distrust of the renewable energy industry as a reliable source of labor-friendly jobs is slowing the “just transition”** that Biden, Gov. Gavin Newsom and Democratic leaders around the country have pushed.

With federal officials trying to get clean energy funding out as fast as possible ahead of the 2024 election, and California **politicians cracking down on the fossil fuel industry, unions’ reluctance to relinquish fossil fuel jobs undermines Democrats’ aggressive climate targets, according to a lawmaker who serves both a union- and oil-rich area of the state.**

While the union embrace of fossil fuels is unique to California — one of the few blue states with significant oil production — the **struggle highlights a larger question over how states can quickly build massive amounts of clean energy infrastructure without undercutting labor.**

“We’re at that crucial fork in the road,” said state Sen. Anna Caballero (D-Salinas), who represents the Central Valley. “The impact of making the wrong decisions is going to be long-lasting and pretty devastating. I don’t think that it’ll be easy to undo the damage.

The Trades’ ties to California’s fossil fuel industry date back more than a century. **Its workers have benefited from project labor agreements with major corporations like Chevron, which guarantee projects are staffed by union employees and set wages, benefits, hours and other labor standards before workers step on a job site.** These **collective bargaining agreements are less common in renewable energy sectors, where companies are often resistant to working with unions.**

#### Unions are fractured and right-leaning.

**Browning 25** (Kellen Browning, political reporter for The New York Times based in San Francisco) “Union Leaders Get Tough with Democrats as Members Drift Toward Trump”, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/09/us/politics/democrats-labor-unions-nevada, DM

Long before President **Trump harnessed a working-class coalition** to **win last November’s election, leaders of the nation’s biggest labor unions, in public and private**, were warning Democrats that those voters could defect. In the months since, their admonitions have grown only more pointed.

Their calculus is simple. Despite campaign promises to improve working people’s lives, and Mr. Trump’s appeal among the rank and file, top union officials do not view the president, whose signature policy law benefits the wealthy, as a true ally of organized labor. And if Democrats regain the ground they’ve **lost with blue-collar voters**, many of whom are union members, it could help leaders with their own struggles, including flagging membership and criticism that they are losing touch with everyday workers.

But it is not likely to be easy.

The shift toward **Mr. Trump among blue-collar voters** last year was the culmination of a trend in recent elections: Democrats gained votes in wealthy, white enclaves, while **Republicans earned new support in working-class regions and among [Latine]** ~~Hispanic~~ **and Black voters**, raising questions about Democrats’ longstanding identity as the defender of working people.

**Union leaders,** who mostly endorsed Kamala Harris even as many of their members scoffed at her candidacy, now find themselves trying to strike a delicate balance, maintaining support for Democratic candidates while **not alienating members who voted for Mr. Trump**. The conundrum is similar to Democrats’ own struggles to understand and court their lapsed voters.

“Every time we talk politics, the first thing that comes up is, ‘The Democrats let us down,’” said Jimmy Williams, the president of the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades. His **140,000 members,** he said, had **split nearly evenly between Ms. Harris and Mr. Trump.**

#### 2. Strikes fail. It’s unsustainable and replacement workers delete employer incentives.

**Harris 23** (Seth D. Harris is a Distinguished Professor of Practice at Northeastern University and Affiliated Faculty and a Senior Fellow at the Burnes Center for Social Change (and its partner project The GovLab) where he runs the Initiative on Labor and Economic Justice. Prior to joining Northeastern University, Professor Harris was the Deputy Assistant to the President for Labor and the Economy and Deputy Director of the Biden White House’s National Economic Council) “Strikes Are a Tactic, Not a Goal”, https://poweratwork.us/strikes-are-a-tactic, June 22, 2023, DM

**Strikes** can create lasting schisms **in communities**. While they may **garner public support**, they can also **create tensions** between **workers and community members** who rely on the services or products provided by the **striking employees**, or simply do not like conflict in their home towns. Strikes often have broader economic implications, affecting the employees of the struck employer’s suppliers and other local businesses, as well as the local economy. The **ripple effects of a strike** can **result in job losses**, decreased consumer spending, and **overall economic instability** in a community.

Another grave risk hovers above many strikes in the U.S.. While it is an **unfair labor practice** for **employers to fire their employees** solely for participating in a strike, **employers can hire “permanent replacement workers” to striking employees’ jobs.** The technical legal distinction between “permanent replacement” and “firing” is that the permanently replaced striking worker, if they have not found an equivalent job elsewhere, can reclaim their job should the replacement worker ever vacate the position. Of course, most workers cannot wait weeks, months, or years hoping a worker who took their job will find yet another job. Practically, **this is a distinction without a difference: permanent replacement is tantamount to firing --- a devastating result for striking workers**. Of course, not all employers want to or can permanently **replace their striking workers**. Nonetheless, the **threat is omnipresent**, and a real **assault on strikes, strikers, and collective bargaining.**

#### Consequentialism and extinction is anti-Black.

Douglass 21, assistant professor of gender, sexuality, and feminist studies at Duke University. (Patrice D., March 2021, “Unnatural Causes: Racial Taxonomies, Pandemic, and Social Contagion”, *Prism: Theory and Modern Chinese Literature*, 18:1, pg. 262-263, https://doi.org/10.1215/25783491-8922273)

In “Blackness and the Pitfalls of Anthropocene Ethics,” Axelle Karera interrogates discourses of disaster and crisis in relation to perceptions of ecological disaster. Karera contends that analyses of the immense of disaster are predicated on an insistence on collectivity that is bolstered by racial erasure. Thus, the discussion of the Anthropocene by many theorists presupposes a Human or ecological teleological progression, together with threats of demise that ahistorically subsume Blackness into a collective form of being that is central to Black suffering. Karera argues that, “insofar as the constant recognition of our existential interdependency cannot substantially challenge the many forms of segregations on the steady rise in our current times, it seems to me that assuming the inevitability of our ontological entanglement may need some re-thinking.”24 After citing the work of Fred Moten in relation to what she calls “relationality’s inability to maintain its ethical currency when faced with the extended rupture blackness sustains on ethics,” Karera continues, “In other words, relationality is inherently not only a position that the black cannot afford or even claim. The structure of relationality is essentially the condition for the possibility of their enslavement. I wonder, therefore, whether our naïve reliance on a type of inherent co-dependence has recently done more harm than good—that is to say, has instead worked to obstruct the very possibility of a positive transformation of our ethical sensibilities.”25 According to Karera, the linking of structural relationality to the conditions of slavery is key. For Blackness, segregation, interdependency, and slavery are relational rather than legally imposed. As such, the interdependence thesis (that we are all in this together) overshadows how the social structuring of Black life and death makes the collective “we” a structurally impossible equivalency, despite the affective and emotional desire for such to be true. Integration also constitutes a problem of relationality or the lack thereof. More to the point, the constitution of “we” is a form of violence that makes the particularities of Black suffering indiscernible under the auspices of equal rights and liberties in private and public spaces. In this respect, Hartman contends that “a slippage between race and status can be detected in the uncertain identi­fi­cation of the source of black degradation,” where the locus of suf­fering is frequently underscored because of the insistence on perceiving the problem as the lack of relational congruency across races with respect to specific phenomenon like global sickness.26 Rather, the conditions of suf­fering must be scaled outward, rather than inward with a narrow focus on pandemic and disease, to address the ethical stakes at the heart of Black death. Thus, employing Karera’s “positive transformation of our ethical sensibilities” to address the conditions of Gatewood’s death requires an acknowledgment of negligence on the part of Beaumont Hospital, together with a cognitive mapping of how care, protection, and safety as conceptual frameworks isolate Blackness as an excisable contagion that is subjected to gratuitous violence that so often leads to spectacularized or muted death. By muted death, I mean forms of death produced by anti-Blackness that go unseen, unaccounted for, or unknown.

#### “Just Transitions” are a ruse of extraction that cause climate change and inequality.

**Dunlap 21** (Alexander Dunlap, “Renewable Energy and the War of Progress”, https://www.peacejusticestudies.org/chronicle/9-renewable-energy-and-the-war-of-progress/, (2021) DM)

Ambiguous and positively loaded words are dangerous. Not only for their multiple interpretations, but also because **people want to believe in what is being sold, and the imaginary attached to them. Everyone can rally behind “change,” “peace,” “justice” and, now with the popular acknowledgement of ecological and climate catastrophe, “renewable energy.” These words, as peace studies is well aware, are double-edged, have many interpretations, and, as with “peace,” are often a euphemism for social pacification** (Dunlap, 2014). We know all too well that **“social peace” is enforced by coercive violence of the police** (Dunlap, 2014; Bachmann et al., 2015; Shanahan, 2021), **and stands on military conquest of Indigenous territories** (Galeano, 1997; Moses, 2008; Rodney, 2009) and the corresponding ecological degradation, if not **ecocide** (Brock, 2020a; Crook and Short, 2020), **necessary for state formation, development, and modernity**.

Justice, like peace, is not much different. There are many interpretations of justice (Foucault, 1980), and Indigenous groups and decolonial scholars have long contested dominant or **Western conceptions of justice** (Mignolo and Escobar, 2010; Tuck and Yang, 2012). Recently, environmental justice studies **has been brought to account by acknowledging multiple forms of justice that extend beyond the distribution of costs and benefits of development projects; the recognition of identity and rights, participation in project design and operation, and capabilities to engage in the latter three processes** (Álvarez and Coolsaet, 2020; Menton et al., 2020). Lina Álvarez and Brendan Coolsaet (2020) demonstrate how there is a liberal presupposition embedded within **environmental justice studies and the framework of ecological distribution conflicts, that assumes people desire integration into the hegemonic national, or transnational, techno-capitalist culture of “development” as opposed to rejecting it outright or tailoring it significantly to local cultures.**

**The political stakes are high with this liberal assumption**. First, this approach narrows **the infinite field of pluriversal possibilities of (post)development** (see Kothari et al., 2019), **slowly regimenting people into more equitable and participatory forms of (techno-capitalist) development and/or extractivism**. A development agenda largely set by states and executed by national and transnational consortiums further impoverishes and/or regiments local imaginaries and diverse cultural approaches to (post)development in a time when new socio-ecological practices are needed more than ever.  Second, this liberal imposition represents another “friendly” approach for integrating infrastructural-psychosocial apparatuses (see Dunlap, 2020a), or development projects into different habitats and cultures, thus leaving the ability to say “no” and propose alternative forms of life and co-creation off the table in favor of development as we know it. Moreover, developmental desires and aspirations are complicated (Dunlap and Sullivan, 2020), where **desire-effects are engineered in various ways by the media industrial-complex, institutional signals, political violence, and concerted ecosystem degradation** (Verweijen and Dunlap, 2021). **The overall concern is how environmental, let alone other forms of justice, can prolong, integrate, and expand techno-capitalist cultural values and infrastructures into social fabrics and habitats across the world, at the expense of culturally appropriate alternatives.**

Finally, **the focus of this article is “renewable energy.” What part does so-called “renewable energy” or “low-carbon” infrastructures play in this struggle for real peace and environmental justice? Low-carbon infrastructures such as wind, solar, and hydrological power sources are celebrated as key technologies to mitigate climate and ecological catastrophe** (GreenPeace, 2015; 350.org, 2020). Renewable energy is “good” and fossil fuels—as symbolized by the Trump administration—are “bad.” The Green New Deal (GND), or the European Green Deal (EGD), are sold as a political possibility and environmental hope (see Aronoff et al., 2019; Chomsky and Pollin, 2020), yet these plans hinge on low-carbon infrastructures and digital technologies.

Jennifer Franco and Saturnino Borras (2019: 193) recognize **“climate change politics may or can displace or dispossess more people from their land than actual climate change.”** This article demonstrates, like conceptions of peace and justice, that **so-called renewable energy continues the negative trajectory of development or the “war of progress”** (Dunlap, 2014: 55). While the proliferation of “low-carbon” energy infrastructure conflicts are becoming well documented (Avila, 2018; Temper et al., 2020), the **negative socio-ecological impacts are far greater than we realize once the multi-dimensional harms of their supply-webs are acknowledged.** This article proceeds by introducing the concept of renewable energy, before breaking down five ways to understand its reality, demonstrating the serious stakes involved in the uncritical embrace and celebration of so-called “renewable energy.” The final section concludes by discussing what appropriate low-carbon technologies might look like and forms of renewable energy we should aim to create.

Rebranding Destruction: 5 Stages of Injustice

**Why do people think that wind, solar, and hydrological energy factories are “renewable?**” Provisionally, two reasons. Long-term marketing arising from the 1973 Oil Crisis, which gave birth to the US Department of Energy and other institutions (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016), which began promoting the idea of energy transition and renewable energy (see also Smil, 2016). Then, once juxtaposed to **the ecological horrors of thermal energy and nuclear power** (Mitchell, 2011; Churchill, 2003), **solar, hydropower, and wind energy factories could be positioned as “clean,” if not “renewable**.” Second, the knowledge claims that wind, solar, and hydrological resources are infinite. **This perspective is limited and disrespectful, neglecting the reality of vital forces, or kinetic energy, and how they are harvested.** While the effects might be subtle, even marginal (compared to mineral and hydrocarbon extraction), there is a vital degradation and dissipation that accumulates resulting in the domestication of rivers, wind, and solar resources from different environments. In the case of large-scale wind factory zones, a wind “velocity deficiency” heats up downwind climates and landscapes (Abbasi et al., 2016). Because of **ecological insensitivities, or ignorance, a form of epistemic violence occurs that neglects the cumulative impact of kinetic energy extractivisms.**

The application of **the concept of “renewable energy” remains riddled with epistemic prejudice and embedded with techno-capitalist values: utility, profit, and socio-ecological control. The category of “energy” itself and the laws of thermodynamics are highly problematic and deserve reorientation given their historical foundations** (see Daggett, 2019). Epistemic insensitivity and the normalization of violence remains central to the war of techno-capitalist progress. These are animated further by briefly outlining five stages by which we should judge low-carbon energy generation technologies: raw material extraction, land contracting, operational impacts, energy use, and decommissioning. The intention here is to highlight how **so-called “renewable energy” is a myth, perpetuating the war of progress predicated on injustice and skewed forms of peace.**

#### 3. Workers are lumpen proletariats, but their interpretation perpetuates erasure.

**Britannica 98** “Lumpenproletariat”, https://www.britannica.com/topic/proletariat, Jul 20, 1998, DM

In the theory of Karl Marx, the term proletariat designated the class of wage workers who were engaged in industrial production and whose chief source of income was derived from the sale of their labour power. As an **economic category** it was distinguished in Marxian literature from the poor, the **working classes**, and the **Lumpenproletariat**. Because of its subordinate position in a capitalist society and the effects of periodic depressions on wages and employment, the proletariat as described by Marxists was usually living in poverty. But it was not therefore identified with the poor, for some members of the proletariat, the highly skilled or labour aristocracy, were recognized as not poor, and some members of the entrepreneurial class were not wealthy. Despite synonymous use in agitational literature, the term proletariat was distinguished from the working class as a generic term. The former referred to those engaged in industrial production, whereas the latter referred to all who must work for their living and who received wages or salary, including agricultural labourers, white-collar workers, and hired help occupied in the distribution services. **The Lumpenproletariat consisted of marginal and unemployable workers of debased or irregular habits and also included paupers, beggars, and criminals.**

#### 4. Collective means to be of a group of people.

**Cambridge No Date** [Cambridge, Collective; https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/collective] cmeow

of or shared by every member of a group of people:

#### 5. Bargaining means to negotiate a transaction.

**Oxford No Date** [Oxford Dictionaries, “Bargaining”, https://languages.oup.com/dictionaries/] cmeow

negotiate the terms and conditions of a transaction.

#### We meet! The 1AC was an affirmative approach within the context of the resolution.

1NC Merriam-Webster 19 – Beach in blue.

Merriam-Webster, Affirmative, 2019, via https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirmative

Affirmative

Definition of affirmative (Entry 1 of 2)

1: asserting that the fact is so

gave an affirmative answer

affirmative proof

2: POSITIVE

an affirmative approach

3: favoring or supporting a proposition or motion

an affirmative vote

was on the affirmative side in the debate

4logic : asserting a predicate of a subject

affirmative noun

Definition of affirmative (Entry 2 of 2)

1: an expression (such as the word yes) of affirmation or assent

2: the side that upholds the proposition stated in a debate

3logic : an affirmative (see AFFIRMATIVE entry 1 sense 4) proposition

#### 3. No limits DA. Negotiated prior to the season, proves they should already have critiques to anti-Blackness K affs, and the Cap K is never concessionary ground!

**Topic paper 25** (“Labor Topic Paper”, Sheima Ben-Abdallah, Nora Cai, Christopher Callahan, Sebastian Rao, Anthony Trufanov, John Turner)

Since **Du Bois’ *Black Reconstruction***, which framed the **end of slavery and Reconstruction as a general strike by Black workers, many have taken up a vision of workers’ emancipation as a tool for racial justice. In this vein, pro-labor white workers highlight the inclusiveness of unions (after their initial rejection of Black workers).** However, other scholars critique this view, arguing that it neglects the subjugation of **Black workers even within nominally inclusive unions and plays into historically exclusionary tropes of the liberated white working class.** Some of **these ideas are already frequently raised in debates under the umbrella of capitalism Ks of affs focused on anti-blackness, and many popular authors such as Tiffany King expressly critique the frame of labor when applied to Blackness.**

#### **3. That proves the subject formation paradox, and turns the fairness paradox.**

Tam 15 [Nicoladie, University of North Texas, “A Decision-Making Phase-Space Model for Fairness Assessment,” SciencePG] recut cmeow

1.2. Decision Dilemma and Conflict Resolution

The selection of the decision choice is often governed by the desired outcome in which the decision-maker has to decide which of the two variables is more important to choose to optimize. A conflict in decision occurs when maximization of one variable will minimize the other, making it impossible to maximize both. Thus, the decision requires choosing between one of the two variables to maximize, when no other alternatives are available.

For the decision to choose between fairness and monetary gain, it is often assumed that monetary gain will override fairness for the decision in economic transactions, while fairness will override monetary gain for the decision in social transactions. But sometimes, there is the **paradoxical decision** that people can choose to forgo **maximization** of either **fairness** or monetary gain to obtain the desired outcome that seems **counter-intuitive**.

<<CONDENSED, NONE OMITTED>>

This paper will explore the theoretical relationship between these two decision criteria, and determine that a logically consistent decision can be made by choosing the fairness criterion, without necessarily choosing the monetary gain criterion to resolve the conflict. Experimental confirmation of the decision model is provided in the companion paper [1] to confirm that the decision can be made using fairness as the decision criterion without necessarily relying on monetary gain as a criterion In examining the decision-making process, many studies use fairness as a factor to determine how decisions are made in economic transactions [2-5] and distributive justice [6-8]. Fairness is also used as a factor to determine how decisions are affected in social interactions [9-21]. Because what is considered as fair (or unfair) is often biased by an individual’s subjective perception, and this bias can alter the decision made by an individual. Thus, it is important to delineate the underlying decision-making criteria so that we can quantify which factor is more important in influencing a decision. Humans are not the only species that use fairness as a criterion for making decisions, primates also use fairness as a factor to make their decisions [22]. Thus, the decision- making process is conserved across species in evolution from primates to humans, which suggests that there is a generalizable universal principle underlying the decision- making process. 1.3. Ultimatum Game as a Tool to Determine the Decision- Making Process in Relation to Fairness Decisions based on fairness have been studied extensively using the classical Ultimatum Game (UG) experimental paradigm in behavioral economics [2, 23-27]. UG is a split- the-money game where the human subject’s decision-making process is deduced from the decision to accept or reject the monetary offer, depending on whether the offer is perceived as fair or not [27]. The rule of the UG is that a proposer offers an amount of money to share with the responder. The responder is asked to make a decision to accept or reject the proposed offer. If the responder decides to accept the money, both keep the money; otherwise, both lose the money. Thus, the decision to accept or reject the offer in UG depends on whether it is better to maximize the monetary gain or maximize fairness in the decision criterion. This provides a useful tool to determine which decision variable — fairness or monetary gain — is more important to use as the decision criterion. Since the rule of UG requires losing the money if the responder rejects the offer, it creates a conflict for inequitable offers, in which the responder cannot maximize fairness and monetary gain at the same time. If the responder chooses money, it would not be fair. If the responder chooses fairness, it cannot gain the money. Thus, it creates a dilemma for the responder to decide which of the two decision criteria is more important to maximize. This provides the condition in which the underlying decision-making process can be examined theoretically, using a logically consistent model, without violating any logical reasoning, or contradicting any decision criteria. Numerous computational models for hypothesizing the decision-making process based on fairness have been developed to describe how fairness is evolved in UG [25, 26, 28-34] using economic game theories [4-7, 35, 36]. We will introduce a different theoretical model to account for the decision-making process that can use a single criterion — fairness — without requiring choosing both fairness and monetary gain as the criteria to resolve the dilemma. Previous decision-making model has incorporated the relativity of fairness considerations to describe how fairness and monetary gain/loss considerations without compromising the decision for fairness over monetary gain [1, 37-40]. This paper will derive a novel decision-making criterion using the geometric quadrant of the decision-space in the fairness- equity stimulus-response function for determining how a decision is made (see Fig. 1 below). 1.4. Relativity in Fairness Assessment in the Decision- Making Process In assessing fairness in the decision-making process, there is an implicit comparison between two entities — self- regarding and other-regarding concerns [13, 14, 41]. Without such comparison, equality and fairness would not exist. When a comparison is made, it is usually based on one frame of reference relative to another (i.e., comparing between self and others). For example, when someone asks us how fair it is, it usually involves an implicit computation to compare others relative to ourselves. In computing subjective fairness, it compares self in relative to others, using a self-centered frame of reference in the comparison. When the frame of reference is switched from a self-centered one to an other-centered one, fairness is also changed from fair into unfair relatively — without changing the amount of disparity between them. On the other hand, objective fairness is computed by comparing the disparity relative to both parties (self and others) using a neutral party’s (a third person’s) standpoint. Thus, objective fairness is computed by including other- regarding concerns using an other-centered frame of reference, while subjective fairness is computed by including only self-regarding concerns using a self-centered frame of reference. Thus, the decision using fairness as the criterion can change depending on whether a self-centered or an other- centered frame of reference is used as the decision criterion. 2. The Relativistic Fairness-Equity Model Expressing the above relativistic relationships mathematically, let us define f as a quantifiable measure of fairness as a vector, and d as the disparity vector between self and others. Then the level of fairness perception in relation to disparity is given by: f = k ⋅ f (d) + b (1) where k is the fairness sensitivity coefficient, b is a constant representing the baseline fairness level, and f(d) is a function of the disparity vector, which can be either a linear or a nonlinear function. The disparity measure is a relativistic measure that is opposite to the equity measure. Without loss of generality, the disparity vector (d) is a vector difference between oneself and others when comparing a quantity — in the case of UG, the monetary difference — between two persons in the proposed monetary offer. The disparity measure can take on a positive or a negative value, depending on whether the disparity is in favor of oneself in the comparison. For instance, if an offer is a bigger amount to oneself than the amount to the other person, then the disparity is a positive value. If the offer is a lesser amount to oneself than the amount to the other person, then the disparity is a negative value. If the offer is the same for both the self and the other person, then the disparity is zero. Since the vector d is a signed quantity, Eq. 1 automatically accounts for the relativity of fairness — what is fair (f) for the self is unfair (–f) for the other person. This relativity in fairness is automatically computed by the change in the sign of disparity from a positive (d) vector to a negative (–d) vector, when the frame of reference is switched from a self- centered frame of reference to an other-centered frame of reference. 2.1. Decision Threshold Using Fairness as a Decision Criterion Note that Eq. 1 also corresponds to the classical stimulus- response (SR) function for fairness in physiological or psychological systems. This fairness stimulus-response function also corresponds to the input/output (I/O) function in computer science. The stimulus is disparity, and the response is fairness. For the UG paradigm, the stimulus is the amount of monetary disparity between the two persons in the offer (or the offer-ratio), which will result in either monetary gain or loss if the responder accepts or rejects the offer, respectively. The stimulus-response function is usually a non-linear sigmoidal function in psychological or physiological systems, rather than a linear function. Since the operating range of most living systems lies in the linear physiological region (in the middle of the sigmoidal stimulus-response function), for simplicity, we will use this linear operating range as a first approximation in our model. That is, given the disparity stimulus d, a person will respond with a fairness perception computed according to Eq. 1. If the decision is based on fairness as a criterion, then the fairness stimulus-response function can be used to determine the fairness threshold in which a person decides to switch from a rejection decision to an acceptance decision. Thus, using this relativistic fairness-equity model, it will allow us to quantify the threshold in which a decision is made, and determine whether monetary gain can be captured in the fairness decision, without using monetary gain as a decision criterion. 2.2. Relativity in Fairness Assessment by Including both Self-Regarding and Other-Regarding Concerns If the decision incorporates self-regarding concerns, it uses the self-centered frame of reference to evaluate fairness for the decision criterion. If the decision incorporates other- regarding concerns, then it uses the other-centered frame of reference to evaluate fairness for the decision criterion. This relativistic model of fairness can account for both self-centered fairness (i.e., how fair it is to “me”) and other- centered fairness (i.e., how fair it is to “you”) by Eq. 1. That is, the equation implicitly incorporates not only a self- centered perspective of fairness (using a local frame of reference), but also an other-centered (non-self) view of fairness (using a global frame of reference). 2.3. Switching Frame of Reference in the Evaluation of Fairness Perception By default, this vectorial model has already encapsulated the inclusion of reference frame implicitly by the signed vector, d, in which relative fairness is computed — i.e., “fairness to me” is computed by f = k•ƒ(d), while “fairness to you” is computed by the opposite vector, f = k•ƒ(–d). To explicitly express the relativity of fairness, let us denote “fairness to me” as f (using a self-centered frame of reference), and “fairness to you” as f' (using the other- centered frame of reference), with the primed notation. Then “fairness to others” is given by: f′ = k′ ⋅ f (d′) + b′ (2) Thus, the decision threshold can be determined by either Eq. 1 or Eq. 2, depending on whether only the self-regarding concerns is incorporated into the decision or the other- regarding concerns are also incorporated into the decision. 2.4. Derivation of Decision Criterion Based on Fairness If the decision is based on fairness, then the criterion to accept or reject an offer is determined by the level of fairness. Let’s say that the decision threshold, θ, is located at neutral fairness level (θ = 0), then the decision is to accept the offer if it is fair, and reject the offer if it is unfair. The decision, δ, would be quantified by: +1, if f ≥ 0 δ=−1, iff≥0 (3) where δ = +1 represents an acceptance decision while δ = –1 represents a rejection decision. If the decision threshold is located at a positive fairness level (θ > 0) for a fair perception or a negative fairness level (θ < 0) for an unfair perception, then the decision is determined by: 2.5. Fairness Bias by Shifting the Baseline Level of Fairness Perception The baseline level of fairness perception is given by the y- intercept of the stimulus-response function f = k•f(d) + b, i.e., the constant b in Eq. 1. Thus, any bias in the fairness baseline level is represented by a change in the constant, b. If the baseline bias is toward a more fair level, then the constant, b, will increase. If the baseline bias is toward the unfair level, then the constant, b, will decrease. This quantification of this fairness bias will allow us to determine how a decision can be affected by a change in the fairness baseline level. 2.6. Decisions Bias Resulted from Changing the Baseline Level of Fairness Perception

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Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the decision criterion is fairness, then the decision would be determined by the level of fairness perceived by the person. Furthermore, if the decision threshold were set according to the fairness level as defined by Eq. 4, then any change in fairness baseline level would alter the decision threshold accordingly.

That is, any **bias** in the **fairness** perception will also bias the **decision**. In other words, if the decision to accept is determined by fairness, and if the **decision** to **reject** is determined by **unfairness**, then when the **fairness perception** is shifted/switched from fair to unfair. The decision, δ, will also change/switch from acceptance (δ = +1) to rejection (δ = –1) according to Eq. 3, if the decision threshold is set at θ = 0. For any other non-zero decision threshold, the decision, d, is given by Eq. 4.

The above logic is generally assumed in the decision- making process when fairness is used as the criterion by most of the UG studies [42-47]. But there are exceptions to the above assumption that seem paradoxical. Sometimes, humans accept **unfair offers**, while other times they may reject **fair offers**. When this occurs, it is often assumed that the decision is either irrational or the **decision** is made using some other **criteria** other than **fairness** [42-47]. But this assertion may not be necessary. We will show below, by using the relativistic fairness-equity model, that the decision can still be made with fairness as the criterion without being irrational, and without incorporating some other factors other than fairness as the criterion.

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2.7. Fairness Bias by Changing the Fairness Sensitivity Fairness perception can also be biased by a change in fairness sensitivity rather than a change in fairness baseline. Fairness sensitivity is quantified by the slope, k, of the stimulus-response function in Eq. 1. If the slope, k, increases, the **sensitivity to fairness** is **heightened** with a much more **exaggerated sense** of **fairness**. If the slope, k, decreases, the sensitivity to fairness is diminished with an indifference perception to fairness. Thus, there are two types of fairness biases — baseline bias and sensitivity bias. **Baseline bias** affects the sense of what is **fair** or **unfair**, whereas **sensitivity bias** affects the heightened or diminished **awareness** of **fairness** or **unfairness**. Baseline bias is quantified by the y-intercept, b, and sensitivity bias is quantified by the slope, k, of the fairness stimulus-response function, f = k•f(d) + b, in Eq. 1. By the same token, if the **decision** criteria were **based** on **fairness**, then fairness baseline, fairness sensitivity, or both can **bias the decision**. Thus, a decision may be altered by changing the y-intercept, b, or the slope, k, of Eq. 1. This summarizes the dependence of decision on fairness biases mathematically. 3. Graphical Representation of the Decision Phase-Space Quadrants Let us represent the objective disparity, d, graphically by the x-axis (independent axis), and the subjective fairness, f, by the y-axis (dependent axis) based on the fairness stimulus- response function, f = k•f(d) + b, in Eq. 1 (see Fig. 1). The same graph is essentially divided into the left-half and the right-half by the y-axis representing inequity (hypo-equity) and hyper-equity, respectively. The graph is also divided into the upper-half and the lower-half by the x-axis, representing a fair and an unfair perception, respectively. When a decision is made, it is made based on the condition of fairness and equity according to the specific quadrant as described below (see Fig. 1). 3.1. Interpretation of the Decision-Space in the Relativistic Fairness-Equity Quadrants Combining the above fairness and equity interpretations, the decision-space in which the decision is made can also be subdivided by four quadrants (see Fig. 1): (a) Upper-left“fairandinequitable”quadrant; (b) Upper-right “fair and hyper-equitable” quadrant; (c) Lower-right“unfairandhyper-equitable”quadrant; (d) Lower-left “unfair and inequitable” quadrant. +1, δ =  − 1 , if f ≥ θ i f f ≥ θ ( 4 )  <<FIGURE OMITTED>> The interpretations of the fairness perception in each of the quadrant are provided below: (a) If the decision is made in the upper-left quadrant decision-space, then it is a lenient decision — it is based on the condition of feeling fair even though it is inequitable (see Fig. 2). (b) If the decision is made in the upper-right quadrant decision-space, then it is a fair decision — it is based on the condition of feeling fair when it is hyper- equitable (see Fig. 2). (c) If the decision is made in the lower-right quadrant decision-space, then it is a greedy decision — it is based on the condition of feeling unfair, even though it is hyper-equitable (see Fig. 2). (d) If the decision is made in the lower-left quadrant decision-space, then it is an unfair decision — it is based on the condition of feeling unfair when it is inequitable (see Fig. 2). 3.2. Relativistic Interpretation of the Fairness-Equity Quadrants when the Frame of Reference is Switched If the frame of reference for evaluating fairness is switched from self to others, then the fairness-equity quadrant graph would become a mirror image of the decision-space graph in Fig. 1. That is, what is hyper-equitable to self is inequitable to others, and vice versa. Thus, these graphs represent subjective fairness based on their own frame of reference. The only exception to this subjectivity is the center dividing line at the absolute equitable offer (disparity d = 0 at x-axis origin), where it is equitable to both self and others, objectively. At this vertical y-axis, the proposed offer is absolutely equitable for both self and others. Thus, the dividing vertical line represents objective fairness relative to any neutral third party (independent of the relative self- centered or other-centered frame of reference). <<FIGURE OMITTED>> 3.3. Decision Criterion Based on Offer-Ratio If the decision criterion were based on the monetary offer- ratio in UG, then it also corresponds to the decision criterion based on the disparity variable in the relativistic fairness- equity model. For instance, if the acceptance decision criterion were set at a specific offer-ratio (at a specific disparity), then the decision space would be divided vertically into two halves instead of four quadrants. The vertically dividing-line is the decision threshold that is based on disparity. This dividing-line is a given by: d=ε (5) where ε is the specific offer-ratio (or disparity) used to determine an acceptance decision. The decision criterion based on disparity is given by: +1, δ =  − 1 , if d ≥ ε i f d < ε ( 6 ) 3.4. Determination of the Decision Threshold using Both Fairness and Disparity Criteria Given that the fairness stimulus-response function in Eq. 4 is used as one of the decision criteria and the disparity in Eq. 6 as the other criterion, then the intersection of these two decision thresholds would determine the exact location (quadrant) within the fairness-equity space in which the decision were made. If both fairness and disparity were used as the criteria, then the decision space where the decision is made is given by: +1, δ =  − 1 , if f ≥ θ and d ≥ ε i f f < θ a n d d < ε ( 7 )

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Any decisions made outside of the decision space in Eq. 7 would appear as irrational, because it is inconsistent with using both fairness and disparity as the criteria. But such paradoxical decisions are not necessarily irrational, but rather caused by using solely one decision variable as the criterion — such as using either fairness or disparity as the criterion. Examples of such paradoxical decision spaces are:

+1, if f ≥ θ and d < ε  
δ =  − 1 , i f f < θ a n d d ≥ ε ( 8 )

+1,

if f < θ and d ≥ ε i f f ≥ θ a n d d < ε

δ =  − 1 ,

( 9 )

It is only paradoxical if both criteria were used, as in Eq. 8 and Eq. 9. But if one of the criteria were used, as in Eq. 4 or Eq. 6, no paradox or irrationality would exist. The paradoxical decision spaces in Eq. 8 and Eq. 9 would merely be a subspace captured by either Eq. 4 or Eq. 6, resolving the paradox or irrationality. That is, if a person decides based solely on the fairness criterion, irrespective of the disparity in the monetary offer, or if money is not an issue for the person, then it is perfectly rational to reject money, because money is not an issue. There can be many other reasons to reject an equitable or accept an inequitable, nonetheless monetary gain/loss is not one of the criteria.

3.5. Identification of Decision Criteria in the Decision Space with Respect to the Fairness-Equity Quadrant

Given that the specific perception of fairness and equity can be represented by the fairness-equity quadrants, we can identify the decision criteria by the graphic location of the quadrant in which the decision threshold is located. That is, if the acceptance decision is located in the hyper-fair and hyper-equitable (upper-right) quadrant, and the rejection decision is located in the unfair and inequitable (lower-left) quadrant, then the decision made is often considered as logical/rational. The exact location of the decision threshold in these quadrants is dependent on the fairness biases, as reviewed in the above sections.

3.6. Rational Decisions due to a Shifting of the Decision Space into a Paradoxical Fairness-Equity Quadrant

On the other hand, if the decision is located in the hyper- fair and inequitable (upper-left) quadrant, then the decision appears to be paradoxical, when a person considers inequitable offers as fair in the decision. Most often, this **paradoxical decision** is assumed to be irrational, but in fact, is **logically consistent** with the relativistic fairness-equity model. This is because the location of the decision criterion is merely being shifted to the upper-left quadrant by the fairness biases in the stimulus-response function. Thus, this results in a decision bias that seems paradoxical or illogical, but it is merely caused by a shift of the decision space into a different fairness-equity quadrant, without contradicting any logical principles for fairness assessment or decision-making. It is merely a result of the **fairness bias**, which **subsequently affects the decision.**

Similarly, if the **decision** is located in the **unfair** and hyper- equitable (lower-right) **quadrant**, then the **decision** appears to be **paradoxical** when a person considers **hyper-equitable offers** as **unfair** in the **decision.** This paradoxical decision is also appeared to be irrational, but in fact, is logically consistent with a shift in the decision space into the lower- right fairness-equity quadrant, without contradicting any logical principles for fairness assessment or decision-making.

The paradoxical decision can be identified as a shift of the **decision space** in the fairness-equity quadrant caused by a **shift** in the **fairness bias.**

3.7. Decisions Based on Fairness Criterion Rather than the Monetary Gain Criterion

Because the amount of monetary gain or loss in UG is directly linked to the amount of disparity in the offer when a person accepts or rejects the offer, an acceptance decision would result in a monetary gain, and a rejection decision would result in monetary loss. Thus, if monetary gain or loss were the criterion for the acceptance or rejection decision, then monetary offer of any amount would always result in an acceptance decision, independent of fairness. Therefore, the decision space for acceptance decision would span all four fairness-equity quadrants.

Thus, the monetary gain or loss is a consequence of the decision rather than the criterion of decision in UG. That is, if a person accepts the money, it will always be a monetary gain. If a person rejects the money, it will always be a monetary loss. The monetary gain or loss is caused by the decision. If the decision were to use monetary gain or loss as the criterion, then the decision is already predetermined, without any regards to fairness or disparity. If the decision were not predetermined by the consequence of monetary gain or loss, then a person could use fairness, disparity/equity or both in the decision criterion (assuming fairness and disparity/equity were the two given choices in the decision, as in the UG paradigm).

If either one criterion — **fairness** or disparity/equity — **were used** as the **decision criterion**, then **no paradoxical** or **seemingly irrational decision** **would exist**. If both criteria — fairness and disparity/equity — were used as the decision criteria simultaneously, then there are some conditions in which the decision may appear to be paradoxical (as in Eq. 8 or Eq. 9). But such paradoxical decision is merely a shift of the decision criterion into the decision space, which is caused by a shift in the fairness perception (i.e., caused a fairness bias) rather than being irrational. The experimental evidence in the companion paper [1] also showed that human subjects behaved precisely as predicted by the relativistic fairness- equity model, which is logically consistent without being irrational when they rejected the monetary offer.

**4. Summary**

The mathematics of the decision-making process using fairness and disparity as the decision criteria is derived theoretically using a relativistic fairness-equity model. The results show that the logically consistent **decisions can be made using either fairness or disparity, or both criteria, without being irrational or paradoxical.** The monetary gain or loss is a consequence of the decision in UG rather than a decision criterion, unless the decisions were predetermined by the monetary gain or loss. These logically consistent decision criteria were deduced graphically by the location of the fairness-equity quadrant in which the decisions were made. The location of the decision space quantifies the rationale in which the decisions were made, i.e., the decision criteria used in making such a decision.